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Abstract: 
Auction rate preferred stock (ARPS) is often regarded as an alternative to other near-cash 
instruments such as commercial paper while the dividend exclusion for ARPS offers tax 
advantages to corporate purchasers. The mean default risk premium for ARPS, relative to 
commercial paper, is estimated at 83 basis points during stable financial markets. This default 
premium appears to surge during unstable equity markets, having jumped by 192 basis points in 
November 1987. Lower-rated ARPS shows even larger changes, with yields 40-50 basis points 
above yields on high-rated ARPS, adjusted for the normal risk premium differential. The 
perceived risk change of ARPS underscores how quickly market participants re-evaluate default 
risk, and even the importance of the priority order among debt and equity claimants. Findings 
suggest ARPS and commercial paper are not an acceptable substitute for commercial paper 
during times of unsettled equity markets. 
 
I. Introduction 
The $8 billion auction rate preferred stock (ARPS) market is included as part of the market for 
near-cash investments. ARPS appears in the literature as an alternative to commercial paper 
(Brealey and Myers (1988), Ross, Westerfield, and Jaffe (1990)). For example, Brealey and 
Myers (1988) find ARPS to be an alternative to money market investments. Likewise, Wall 
Street markets ARPS as a substitute for commercial paper (Chambliss (1985)). Because it is 
equity and pays dividends, ARPS provides tax benefits to corporate investors. This tax advantage 
allows ARPS issuers to pay relatively low dividend yields. 
 
In this study ARPS is evaluated as a near-cash investment with risk and return characteristics 
comparable to commercial paper. Findings indicate ARPS should not be viewed as a near-cash 
investment, especially during times of unsettled markets, such as October 1987. 
 
II. ARPS versus Commercial Paper as Near-Cash Instruments 
ARPS yields are set by telephone dutch auction each forty-nine days and are bid by potential 
buyers. All accepted bids receive the same settled rate (the stop- out rate), which is the highest of 
the lowest accepted bids. The settled dividend must fall between an upper and lower collar, 
typically set at 59 percent and 110 percent to 125 percent of the current AA commercial paper 
rate. Given similar maturity and liquidity characteristics, yield differentials between ARPS and 
commercial paper must be explained by taxes and default risk. 
 
To evaluate the tax effects of ARPS and commercial paper, assume the firm is financed with 
common stock, commercial paper, and ARPS only, and that all three securities are purchased by 
corporate investors as perpetuities (Miller (1977)). Let Vu and VL be the value of an unlevered 
and levered firm; further, let CPm be the amount of commercial paper financing at market. The 
value of the levered firm is given as follows: 
 
 
where the corporate purchaser's tax rate is tpc, the issuing corporation's tax rate is tic, and the 
dividend exclusion is te.
1
 The second term on the right-hand side is the gain to commercial paper 
financing over either common stock or ARPS financing. When this term is greater than zero, a 
tax gain to commercial paper exists. When the issuing corporation and the purchasing 
corporation have the same tax rate (t, = tpc), the relative dollar advantage to commercial paper 
financing is CPm[tpc(1 — te)]. In this case, the issuing firm always realizes a tax gain because the 
dividend exclusion is less than 100 percent. Thus, with a 34 percent marginal corporate tax rate 
and 70 percent dividend exclusion, the net dollar advantage to the issuer is (CPm*0.1020). When 
the buyer is in the 34 percent tax bracket, the issuing firm increases its value by issuing ARPS 
only if its tax rate is less than 26.53 percent. Therefore, firms with large tax shields (low tax 
rates) should finance with ARPS rather than commercial paper. 
 
If instead ARPS and commercial paper are held by corporations but common stock is held by 




where ARPSm is the market value of ARPS. The net gain of commercial paper financing over 
ARPS financing is the second minus the third term on the right-hand side in equation (2). 
 
When tps = tpc and to = 0, the net gain to commercial paper G net is identical to the tax gain in equation (1). 
 
If tax effects indicate that firms in high marginal tax brackets should choose commercial paper instead of 
ARPS financing, other reasons must explain why highly profitable firms issue ARPS. An examination 
of the profile of ARPS issuers indicates that most are financial firms. It is reasonable to suggest that 
equity capital requirements set by regulators can be better met using ARPS, which has capital costs below 
                                                 
1
 Mathematical derivations of equations presented in this paper are available from the authors upon request. 
common equity. Large financial firms might use ARPS financing despite the negative tax effects because 
ARPS is a lower priority claim than commercial paper. Unlike interest, preferred stock dividends can go 
unpaid in times of financial distress. 
 
Miller (1977) extends the equilibrium conditions to allow for risky borrowing. Similarly, if commercial 
paper and ARPS have risk that can be priced according to the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), the 
value of the levered firm remains as shown in equation (1), assuming the interest rates on ARPS and com-
mercial paper are risk adjusted to equal CAPM-expected returns. 
 
Alderson, Brown, and Lummer (1987) suggest yield differentials between ARPS and 
commercial paper are primarily tax induced with little default risk effect. They find ARPS yields 
to be 202 basis points below commercial paper yields. For the purchaser, the after-tax spread 
(using the top tax rate of 46 percent in 1986) is found to be 96 basis points above commercial 
paper. For borrowers, ARPS costs 132 basis points more after taxes than commercial paper 
because of the tax deductibility of interest versus dividends. Alderson, Brown, and Lummer 
acknowledge that their analysis ignores investment risk because none of the auctions examined 
resulted in a loss of invested capital or dividend income. Therefore, they suggest that commercial 
paper and ARPS are equally low in risk with a remarkable degree of certainty, which occurs as a 
direct result of the seven-week dutch auction process. Recent experience, including failed 




Ill. Data and Methodology 
This research uses Salomon Brothers data on ARPS; Salomon calls them dutch auction rate 
preferred stock (DARPS). Salomon reports the outcome of ARPS auctions for 199 ARPS issues 
beginning in August 1984. The ARPS data include 1,170 auctions of ARPS consistently rated A 
or better by Moody's during the entire two and a half years, and 70 auctions of ARPS with Baa, 
Ba, or B ratings.
3
 The total sample of 1,240 auctions represents 71 issues that were first marketed 
before first quarter 1986. 
 
The main explanatory variable is the after-tax AA commercial paper rate. The highest tax rate for 
corporate purchasers is applied to the AA commercial paper index by year. After-tax ARPS 
yields should be comparable to after-tax commercial paper yields adjusted for default risk. The 
regression equation modeling this relationship is: 
 
where 
                                                 
2
 As an example, M-Corp's ARPS yielded 73 percent of the commercial paper index rate at early auctions. The yield 
increased as the company's credit deteriorated. An incomplete auction occurred in August 1987 when the dividend 
yield was reset at the upper collar limit of 150 percent. Successive auctions failed as the yields were set at the collar. 
In October 1988 M-Corp stopped paying its preferred stock dividends; in April 1989 the company failed. 
3
 The limited number of auctions with low-rated issues reflects the high dividend cost issuers of low-rated ARPS 
must pay purchasers. The seventy auctions represent all auctions of low-rated issues from Salomon Brothers during 
this period. 
 
The commercial paper coefficient captures the related movement of ARPS and commercial paper 
yields. Dummy variables for the Baa, Ba, and B ratings capture the additional yield of low-rated 
issues above the high-rated (A or better) ARPS yield; the high-rated ARPS auctions are the 
reference base. The regression adjusts for changes in the risk premium each year by using 
dummy variables for 1987 and 1988. The regression has dummy variables for periods 
surrounding October 19 that capture abnormal yields in high-rated ARPS from changes in de-
fault risk.
4
 These dummy variables might be expected to be significantly positive starting the 
week of October 19-25. Interaction variables measure the yield spread between high- and low-
rated ARPS for the event period. These are time interval dummy variables multiplied by the 
dummy variable for high-rated ARPS. The interaction coefficients capture the basis-point 
differential between high- and low-rated ARPS for each interval. 
 
IV. Empirical Results 
The implied risk premium averages 83 basis points from January 1986 to June 1988. The implied 
risk premium is the ARPS yield minus the AA commercial paper yield adjusted for taxes at the 
highest rate and appropriate dividend exclusion each year. Alderson, Brown, and Lummer (1987) 
find a comparable premium of 96 basis points. 
 
Table 1 reports the abnormal returns for the ordinary least squares regression. The after-tax AA 
commercial paper yield coefficient of 1.173 indicates ARPS yields move directly with 
commercial paper yields. In September and the weeks in early October before the market break, 
no significant abnormal returns were present. Positive abnormal returns averaging 79 basis 
points for high-rated ARPS occurred October 19-31. These grew steadily following October 19, 
and reached a maximum 192 basis-point spread during December. In early 1988 the spread 
declined. 
 
Table 1 shows substantial yield differentials on lower-rated issues. This premium ranges from 
120 basis points on Baa issues to 460 basis points on B issues. The yield differential between 
low- and high-rated ARPSs increased dramatically immediately following October 19. While 
high-rated ARPS had a 146 basis point abnormal yield in November 1987, the spread interaction 
variable shows that yield to be 41 basis points less than the yield on lower-rated ARPS, adjusted 
                                                 
4
 The seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) technique (Zellner (1962)) is often implemented for solving statistical 
problems associated with event clustering, which frequently occurs with a common event (Binder (1985)). The 
Parks (1967) procedure is equivalent to Zellner's two-stage SUR methodology applied to a generalized least squares 
model corrected for autocorrelation. The regression coefficients under Parks and ordinary least squares are nearly 
identical, indicating no problem with contemporaneous covariation of the error term. 
for the "normal" difference in yield attributed to default risk in November. A significant yield 
differential of 28 basis points persisted into January 1988. These findings suggest that investors 
expected higher default rates following the market crash. 
 
V. Conclusions 
Finding suggest ARPS and commercial paper are not acceptable' substitutes during unsettling 
equity market conditions when corporate investors impose a substantially higher default risk 
premium on ARPS. The economic implications for ARPS purchasers and issuers are apparent 
during the period considered. For holders of an ARPS security with a $500,000 par value, 
purchasers received a monthly average of $540 to $1,306 more per auction. Issuers incurred 
substantial costs. For every $100 million of ARPS, issuers paid a monthly average between 
$117,470 and $283,910 more in dividend expenses per auction than normal.
5
 For lower-rated 
issues, the dividend cost was even higher. 
 
The costs reported represent unavoidable expenses for the issuer. ARPS contractual covenants 
place substantial mandatory redemption costs and penalties in the event of dividend default; 
indeed, ARPS holders sometimes gain voting rights. These serious consequences underscore the 
suggestion that ARPS can be a poor substitute for commercial paper. 
 
                                                 
5
 These additional returns for purchasers are determined by converting the highest and lowest coefficients found in 
Table 1 into decimals and multiplying by 49 days/360 days and the dollar amount: $500,000 X (0.01919 x (49/360)) 
= $1,305.99 and $500,000 x (0.00794 x (49/360)) = $540.36. For issuers, the largest after-tax dollar amount is found 
as follows: $100 million x (0.01919 x (49/360)) = $261,197.22. Solving for the before-tax ARPS yield (BTARPS), 
$261,197.22 = BTARPS (1-(.40)(.20)), results in a before-tax cost of $283,910.02. The 40 percent marginal tax rate 
and 80 percent exclusion reflect tax code provisions in 1987. 
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